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Confronted by the current global economic crisis, Taipei,China’s economy has suffered 
much like its neighbors. However, Taipei,China is different from other East Asia economies 
in several aspects. First, Taipei,China’s industrial organization is dominated by small and 
medium-sized  enterprises (SMEs), unlike the chaebols of the Republic of Korea or the 
Japanese Kabushiki-gaish. Second, Taipei,China has experienced extraordinary “hollowing-
out” of its industrial base as many firms (both large and SMEs) have moved their 
manufacturing operation to People’s Republic of China (PRC).  
This is also manifested in the fact that Taipei,China has become one of the largest sources 
of FDI in the PRC, and Taipei,China’s trade dependency with the PRC is ever rising. A silver 
lining is that when the sub-prime crisis hit the United  States  and weakened her import 
demand, the aforementioned hollowing-out meant less direct employment impact on 
Taipei,China. 
However, given the dominance of SMEs in Taipei,China (97.6% of business establishments, 
and 77.1% of employment), it is of vital importance to develop ways to aid SMEs in surviving 
this crisis. Indeed, the government can utilize this crisis to reform and strengthen SMEs so 
they can continue to be the backbone of Taipei,China’s economy. In this paper, I discuss the 
strengths and weaknesses of SMEs in Taipei,China. Policy recommendations are presented 
to address the weaknesses of the SMEs, including short-run and long-run approaches. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
At the closing of the 2009 G-8 summit (held in L’Aquila, Italy on 8–10 July), United States 
(US) President Barack Obama declared that a disastrous economic collapse had apparently 
been averted. His tone was  much more upbeat  than  when he first took office  when he 
predicted that the economic recovery might not come until his second term in office. Last fall, 
as the catastrophic downturn was conceded  as inevitable, the debate was whether the 
recovery would be L-shaped or V-shaped (Hou 2009a).
1 Last December, I went on record to 
say that it would be V-shaped. I also predicted that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
would fare far better than the US, which would see recovery no later than August of 2009.
2 
This was certainly against the mainstream belief at the time. However, things have changed 
rapidly in the last couple of months. Though the jury is still out regarding whether the US 
economy will start to grow in August, the consensus is that this should happen no later than 
the end of 2009. On 5 August 2009, the Asian Development Bank Institute announced, that 
“East Asia’s rebound from the worst global recession since the Great Depression may be  
V-shaped.”
3 This is perhaps best illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
The advanced economies have been hit the hardest, while the emerging and less developed 
countries are affected less. This is hardly surprising as the advanced economies are far 
more integrated into the world economy. In the World Economic Outlook Update (July 2009), 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated that the global economy had stabilized, though 
this stabilization was uneven across regions and the recovery would be sluggish. However, 
in April 2009, the World Economic Outlook
                                                 
1 Nouriel Roubini (who correctly foresaw this round of world financial collapse more than 2  years ago) 
pessimistically predicted that the world would experience a long and slow L-shaped recovery. 
 had projected that global growth would be half a 
percentage point higher. This can be viewed  with some slight optimism, but the uneven 
pattern is evident. The coordinated world effort totaling US$2.2 trillion in stimulus 
undoubtedly played a key role. For the US, signs are abound that the worst is over, though 
the recovery will obviously take time. Even Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke showed 
2 Keynote speech at the opening of the International Conference of the International Center for Chinese Studies, 
Aichi University, Nagoya, Japan, 6 December 2008.  
3 A slightly more pessimistic view would have a smaller decline in economic activity as the fiscal stimulus runs its 
course before the real recovery kicks in. This would result in a W-shaped recovery. 
Figure 1: Global GDP Growth 
(%, quarter-on-quarter, annualized） 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. 




cautious optimism, in recent testimony in Congress, saying that the economy may have 
entered an expansion phase. 
Compared with the 1998 Asian financial crisis, this round of economic downturn—caused by 
the subprime collapse in the US—spread much further and with terminal velocity; clear 
evidence that we are approaching a true global village. The two largest economies in Asia—
the PRC and India—still enjoy strong positive growth, but a relative slowdown is equally 
evident. The remaining Asian economies are suffering to various degrees; they are trying 
drastic measures to revive their  economies, with varying degrees of success. This 
conference aims to understand the impact of this economic crisis on Asian economies and to 
draw on experience with previous crises to help us weather this round of global economic 
downturn. My role is to discuss the impact of this crisis on the industrial structure and firm 
activities in our host economy, Taipei,China. 
At the outset, let me outline the special distinctiveness of Taipei,China, which will also form 
the structure for the analysis. Taipei,China has several unique characteristics, historically 
and geographically. It is a trade-oriented economy, with an export–gross domestic product 
(GDP) ratio of close to 24% in 2008, and an increasing intimacy with the PRC. In 2008, 
exports to the PRC accounted for 38.95% of total exports; more than its  exports  to the 
European Union, Japan, and the US combined. Like the other newly industrialized countries, 
Taipei,China’s industrial structure has become increasingly specialized, with electronic 
components (especially computer components) as the main industry. It  has  a highly 
educated workforce. The percentage of the population with postsecondary education has 
risen dramatically from 16.8% in 1993 to 34.3% in 2008. It  has often been termed the 
“kingdom of small and medium-sized enterprises” (SMEs)—in 2007, SMEs accounted for 
97.6% of business establishments, employing 77.1% of the workforce.  
However, before I delve into a discussion on Taipei,China, it is important to recognize a few 
facts. The current economic crisis is a collapse of the final product market, which quickly and 
severely impacted the heavily export-oriented East Asia economies. In contrast, the 1998 
East Asian financial crisis originated in the supply chain and hence the impact was more 
contained. While the affected economies suffered, the solution was more direct and mostly 
relied on currency depreciation to restore export ability. For the global economy, as 
important as these East Asia economies were in the supply chain, substitutes did exist and 
hence left the global economy mostly intact. Metaphorically, the 1998 Asian crisis was as if a 
trans-Pacific flight hit turbulence and  a stronger than usual headwind—passengers will 
experience a slight delay and discomfort, but the overall flight schedule will not be affected. 
The  downturn is effectively a shutdown of the destination airport, which will undoubtedly 
have a much more significant effect on the flight, and since it is a major international airport 
with numerous connecting flights, the delay or cancelation will be immediate and 
widespread. 
2.  ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CHARACTERISTICS 
The often referred to “economic miracle” of Taipei,China is not just about sustained rapid 
growth, but rather that this growth came with improved income distribution.
4
                                                 
4 Kuo, Ranis, and Fei (1981). Fields (1984) found Taipei,China to have the lowest Gini coefficient among all 
developing economies in his sample period. 
 This can be 





Table 1: Selected Indicators of Taipei,China’s Economy, 1952–1996 
Period  1952–1960  1961–1970  1971–1980  1981–1990  1991–1996 
Per Capita GNP (current 
US$) 
 160.4  245.4  1,181.8  4,601.6  11,194.8 
Real GDP Growth (%)   7.6  10.0  9.4  8.1  6.3 
Unemployment Rate (%)   2.5  1.9   0.9   1.3  1.0 
Inflation Rate (%)   9.85  3.41 
a  11.08   3.15   3.65 
Income Distribution   … 
b  5.11 4.28





f  21.1  31.8  33.3  26.9 
Capital Formation (%)  16.3 
g  21.9   30.5  22.5   23.4 
Trade/GNP (%)  22.2 
h  37.4   81.1  83.8  75.4 
Growth of Exports (%)   22.0  26.5  29.3   10.0   10.1 




 1953–1960 only. 
b
 
 Ratio of highest 20% household income over lowest 20%. 
c
 
 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1970 only. 
d
 






 Gross domestic saving–GNP ratio. 
g
 
 Gross domestic capital formation–GNP ratio. 
h
Source: Li 1995. 
 (Exports+Imports)–GNP ratio. 
The  reasons  for this “equal wealth” are  multifaceted  and  include early land reform, 
government guidance, human capital, and the role of SMEs. Interested readers can refer to 
(Kuo, Ranis, and Fei 1981; Hou and Appleton 1996; Li 1995; and Tsai 1999) for discussion.  
Though Taipei,China has shown improvements in the last few years, growth in the decade 
since 1996 has been relatively stagnant. From a pure development point of view, perhaps 
Taipei,China has matured and reached a natural plateau, but then why have the other Asian 
Tigers
5 continued to grow. Other more ominous explanations include the political strife that 
has held the economy in its grips as part of democratic reforms.
6 At the same time, cross-
strait talks have been stalled from 1996 until the last couple of years. Compounding the 
effect was the PRC’s rapid opening up to foreign direct investment (FDI), which attracted an 
increasing amount of Taipei,China investment to the PRC (Hou and Zhang 2000 and 2001). 
This resulted in a “hollowing out” of Taipei,China’s industrial base (Hsieh 1999), and has led 
to large increases in unemployment since 1996.
7
A direct side effect of the hollowing-out of the industrial base is the dramatic increase in 
Taipei,China’s FDI in the PRC. Historically, Taipei,China  has been among the top five 
sources of FDI in the PRC, and for a while it was the second largest source after Hong 
  
                                                 
5 Hong Kong, China; Singapore; and the Republic of Korea. 
6 For example, Lee (2008) found that the new political leadership of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and 
the policy reforms they brought in, had aggravated income inequality since 2000. 
7 The average unemployment rate from 1996 to 2007 was 3.75%—much higher than for all previous periods. 
During the 2000–2007 administration, when the cross-strait relationship was more confrontational, 





8 For those familiar with Taipei,China’s FDI in the PRC, it is nothing more than 
natural and business as usual. But, for most other scholars, it may not be quite as apparent 
why Taipei,China concentrates its FDI in one country,  the PRC. The puzzle has a very 
simple explanation: all Taipei,China’s nationals (with the exception of indigenous people) are 
migrants from the PRC. The mainlanders mostly migrated with Chiang Kai-shek and the 
KMT (the Nationalist Party) to Taipei,China in 1949, while others migrated from the PRC as 
far back as the 17th century.
9
Thus it should be no surprise that early Taipei,China FDI in the PRC concentrated in Fujian 
Province (Hou and Zhang 2001), probably to their ancestral homeland. Once Taipei,China’s 
firms became more confident, investment quickly spread to almost every corner of the PRC, 
much more so than for any other foreign investor. To enhance this, Taipei,China’s official 
language is Mandarin, which is also the official language of the PRC; the written language 
was unified two millennia ago (although the PRC uses a simplified version today). The 
ancestral link and common history, culture, and language (spoken and written) all drastically 
reduce the cost or risk of doing business in the PRC for Taipei,China entrepreneurs, leading 
to the overwhelming concentration of Taipei,China FDI in the PRC, despite government 
attempts to diversify by encouraging investment in Southeast Asia. 
 Thus, all Taipei,China residents can trace their ancestral home 
to somewhere in the PRC. The vast majority are from southern Fujian province in the south 
of the PRC. The local language of Taipei,China is the southern Fujian dialect.  
The direct consequence of this is the continued increase in cross-strait trade. Taipei,China 
has been an export-oriented economy for the past 40 years and remains so today. This, of 
course, makes it vulnerable to downturns in the world economy, as this round of external 
disturbance  illustrates. However, over  the past two decades, the trading  partners for 
Taipei,China have changed. Taipei,China maintains a trade surplus; but if cross-strait trade 
is removed, it is seen to have been running a trade deficit with the rest of the world for about 
20 years. 
3.  TRADE DEPENDENCY  
Like most developing economies, Taipei,China went through an import substitution stage, 
before entering an export era in the 1960s. During that decade, trade volume increased 
fivefold, and accelerated  to a tenfold increase in the 1970s. Growth  has since slowed 
(doubled in the 1980s, and almost doubled in the 1990s). However value-added increased 
as export composition shifted dramatically in the late 1970s and early 1980s—from 
predominantly agricultural commodities to industrial goods (now 98%). Thereafter, industrial 
exports maintained this dominance but also went through several major structural 
changes.
10
                                                 
8 An argument can be made that the FDI from Hong Kong, China is grossly overestimated as close to 50% of the 
Hong Kong, China investments are “round-tripping” of PRC funds, i.e., PRC funds returning to the PRC via 
Hong Kong, China so as to take advantage of preferential treatment given to foreign investments. In contrast, 
Taipei,China’s  FDI in the PRC many be significantly understated, as significant restrictions are placed on 
Taipei,China firms investing in the PRC. This leads to underground investments and investments via foreign 
subsidiaries of Taipei,China firms (Hou 2009b). 
 Today, the information and electronics industry is at the center of the export 
portfolio. 
9 The first major wave came with the late Ming Dynasty General Zheng Cheng-Kung as he defeated the Dutch 
(who had occupied Taipei,China) in 1662 and used it as a base for military campaigns  against the Ching 
Dynasty that defeated the Ming. After the end of the Zheng holdout, the Ching court intentionally encouraged 
migration to solidify development and the jurisdiction of Taipei,China. 
10 The first major structural change occurred in the late 1970s, as Taipei,China’s manufacturing exports changed 
from items such as textiles, shoes, and umbrellas, to basic computer electronics. This was a pivotal point in 
Taipei,China’s economic development as this structural upgrade coincided with the first major human capital 




That was not the case in the early stages. Taipei,China started relying on agriculture exports 
to Japan, with bananas and fresh-water eels among the major items (Hou and Appleton 
1996). Agricultural products continued to account for more than 50% of exports well into the 
mid-1960s, before industrial products (mainly textiles) exceeded agricultural exports before 
the close of the decade. This side of Taipei,China’s economic history is well documented 
(Figure 2).  
 
Source: Department of Statistics. Ministry of Finance; Taipei,China 
The pace of growth of Taipei,China’s trade volume continues in this new millennium. From 
2001 to 2008, total trade volume had doubled (Table 2). While 2009 will undoubtedly be a 
down year, I am confident it will not be enough to bring the decade to below a  twofold 
increase. Under strategic government policy guidance, US aid, human capital investment, 
and benefits from stable world growth, Taipei,China has enjoyed consistent trade surpluses 
for most of the past four decades. In fact, since 1986 its average trade surplus has been 
US$14,395 million/year,
11
Disregarding the global recession of 1982, Taipei,China  has experienced  only  
3 years (including 2009) where the growth rate of exports was negative: 1998 (East Asian 
financial crisis), 2001 (World Trade Center attack), and 2009. Even in these down years, 
trade dependence was high. In 1998, its trade surplus fell 20% from the previous year, but 
was still 2.7% of real GDP (down from 3.2% for 1997). In terms of total trade (exports plus 
imports), the trade dependency (trade/GDP ratio) was 80% down from 91% in 1997 and 
exports accounted for 41% of GDP  down from  43.6%. In 1999,  the  trade surplus rose 
sharply (70%) to US$12.5 billion, or 4.3% of real GDP, with the trade–GDP ratio at 81% and 
exports accounting for 42.5% of GDP. 
 despite several downturns in the global economy.  
                                                 
11 Roughly after the Rostovia take-off (Rostow 1960). See Fuess and Hou (2009) for a discussion. 








Agriculture  91.9  67.7  21.4  9.2  4.5  1.4  1.4 
Industrial  8.1  32.3  78.6  90.8  95.5  98.6  98.6 
1952  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  2007 




 Table 2: Historical Performance of Taipei,China’s External Trade  
  Trade Volume (US$ million)  Growth Rate (%) 
Year  Exports  Imports  Balance  Exports  Imports 
           
1981  22,611  21,200  1,412  14.1  7.4 
1982  22,204  18,888  3,316  (1.8)  (10.9) 
1983  25,123  20,287  4,836  13.1  7.4 
1984  30,456  21,959  8,497  21.2  8.2 
1985  30,726  20,102  10,624  0.9  (8.5) 
1986  39,862  24,182  15,680  29.7  20.3 
1987  53,679  34,983  18,695  34.7  44.7 
1988  60,667  49,673  10,995  13.0  42.0 
1989  66,304  52,265  14,039  9.3  5.2 
1990  67,214  54,716  12,498  1.4  4.7 
1991  76,178  62,861  13,318  13.3  14.9 
1992  81,470  72,007  9,464  6.9  14.6 
1993  85,092  77,061  8,030  4.4  7.0 
1994  93,049  85,349  7,700  9.4  10.8 
1995  113,342  104,012  9,330  20.2   21.4 
1996  117,581  102,922  14,659  3.7   (1.0) 
1997  124,170  114,955  9,215  5.6   11.7 
1998  112,595  105,230  7,366  (9.3)   (8.5) 
1999  123,733  111,196  12,537  9.9   5.7 
2000  151,950  140,732  11,218  22.8   26.6 
2001  126,314  107,971  18,344  (16.9)   (23.3) 
2002  135,317  113,245  22,072  7.1   4.9 
2003  150,601  128,010  22,590  11.3   13.0 
2004  182,370  168,758  13,613  21.1   31.8 
2005  198,432  182,614  15,817  8.8   8.2 
2006  224,017  202,698  21,319  12.9   11.0 
2007  246,677  219,252  27,425  10.1   8.2 
2008  255,629  240,448  15,181  3.6   9.7 
2009 88,485 
a  72,955  15,530  (34.2)   (42.3) 
Notes: ( ) = negative value. 
a
Source: Ministry of Finance, Customs data (June 2009). Exports based on FOB (Free On Board), imports are CIF 
(Cost, Insurance, and Freight). 
 Cumulative through June. Growth rate is compared with the same period (Jan–Jun) of 2008.  
Taipei,China was relatively unscathed by the 1998 East Asian financial crisis, as real GDP 
grew at a rather robust 5% (whereas, GDP fell in Indonesia by 13%, in Thailand by 11%, and 
in the Republic of Korea by 7%).  
On the surface, 2001 seemed a like a different matter. Taipei,China’s real GDP contracted 
by 5% in 2002, while 2001 still registered a healthy 6% growth. Exports fell by 17% in 2001 
but rebounded with 7% growth in 2002, but still below the 2000 level. Despite these grim 
figures, the trade surplus rose to US$18 billion or 6% of GDP (as imports fell even more than 
exports). Trade dependency (trade–GDP) fell from 103% in 2000 to 78% in 2001. In terms of 
exports, trade dependency fell to 42% (from over 53% in 2000). By 2002, Taipei,China had 
stabilized.  The surplus was 7% of GDP, and the trade dependencies were both slightly 
higher than the previous year. A similar pattern will most likely follow in this latest downturn.  
The IMF estimates that Taipei,China’s economy will contract 7.5% in 2009 (World Economic 
Outlook 2009, April); Global Insight puts it at a 4.5% contraction. However, outsiders seem 




estimates paint a slightly more optimistic picture, putting the contraction at 2.1%.
12
These comparisons are meant to demonstrate the resilience of the Taipei,China economy. 
While not trivializing the economic crisis, I am optimistic that Taipei,China will rebound from 
this latest round of economic storm no later than mid 2010. Indeed, many positive signs are 
emerging.  Taipei,China  is the world's largest supplier of contract computer chip 
manufacturing (foundry services) and is a leading  manufacturer of LCD  (liquid crystal 
display)  panels, DRAM (dynamic random access memory), networking equipment, and 
consumer electronics (designer as well). The worldwide stimulus worth US$2.2 trillion has 
stabilized demand and boosted shipments for exporters including Komatsu and Taipei,China 
Semiconductor Manufacturing. Taiwan Semiconductor,
 This 
contraction is roughly comparable to 2001. And, like 2001, the decrease in imports outpaced 
the drop in exports, and the trade surplus is poised to be higher than 2008 (it had already 
surpassed the total surplus of 2008 by June of this year). In 2008, the trade surplus was 
3.8% of GDP, and trade dependency had risen significantly to 124% (trade/GDP ratio ) and 
64% (export/GDP ratio), respectively (this reflects the dramatic rise in exports to the PRC 
from 2001 to 2008). 
13
The hollowing-out of Taipei,China’s industrial base, which has been a hot issue for almost 
two decades, seems to have little impact on the resiliency of the economy. Nevertheless, 
this hollowing-out due to the massive FDI in the PRC has made the cross-strait economies 
seem like Siamese twins (at least from Taipei,China’s point of view). Since the early mid-
1990s,  Taipei,China’s investment in the PRC has been growing exponentially (Hou and 
Zhang 2000, 2001). Parallel to this, the major trading partner (especially in terms of export 
destination) has exhibited dramatic change.  Figure 3  shows  Taipei,China’s major export 
destinations since 2000. Throughout this period, exports to the US and Japan have been 
fairly stable, with a slight decrease in the US and a small rise in Japan. 
 the world’s biggest made-to-order 
chipmaker, said sales in June (2009) were 5.3% higher than in May. The company is a 
bellwether for the electronics industry because it makes chips for products ranging from 
mobile phones to game consoles. In addition, part of Taipei,China’s contraction is due to the 
fact that many industrial manufacturers, such as Taipei,China Semiconductor, have been 
drawing from their inventory. With inventory almost depleted, these manufacturers will need 
to expand production and restock shelves. 
                                                 
12 This is the simple average of the forecast by the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, the 
Council for  Economic Planning and Development, Chung-hua Institution for Economic Research, and 
Taipei,China Institute of Economic Research. 




Figure 3: Exports by Destination (in US$ million)  
 
Notes: PRC/HKG = The People’s Republic of China; and Hong Kong, China. ASEAN-6 = Viet Nam, Singapore, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines. 
Source: Department of Statistics, Ministry of Finance; Taipei,China 
However, the other three major partners showed much more dramatic shifts. Taipei,China’s 
exports to the European Union and to ASEAN-6 countries increased over this period, with 
the latter growing at a faster rate than the former, resulting in ASEAN-6 overtaking the 




 Dominating this otherwise significant result is the overwhelming increase in 
Taipei,China’s exports to the PRC (and Hong Kong, China). In 2000, Taipei,China exported 
less to the PRC than to the US. Exports grew rapidly after the 2001 contraction, and by 2008 
exports to the PRC were more than three times exports to the US. In fact, exports to the 
PRC are almost the sum of exports to the other four destinations. To bring this into better 










                                                 




















Figure 4: Trade Surplus (in US$ million) 
 
Notes: PRC/HKG = The People’s Republic of China; and Hong Kong, China. ASEAN-6 = Viet Nam, Singapore, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines. 
Source: Department of Statistics, Ministry of Finance; Taipei,China 
As impressive as Taipei,China’s trade surplus is, if we superimpose Taipei,China’s trade 
surplus with the PRC, it is evident that Taipei,China has been running a trade deficit with the 
rest of the world since 1996. In this round of economic crisis, some have pointed to this 
intimate tie with the PRC as the root cause of  Taipei,China’s contraction, arguing that 
Taipei,China perhaps should diversify and reduce economic ties with the PRC. I disagree 
and the statistical evidence is clearly against this. Given Taipei,China’s export distribution, 
one only needs to look at the IMF’s 2009 World Economic Forecast to draw this inevitable 
conclusion. The IMF projected 6.5% growth for the PRC, and about the same for ASEAN-6  
(Table 3). In July 2009, the World Economic Outlook update upgraded the PRC’s projected 
growth rate to a much more robust 7.5%. It also upgraded the projection for Japan and the 
Asian Tigers as a whole, with a slight downgrade for ASEAN-5 countries. Taipei,China’s 
current export distribution is noted to be “ideal.” and the massive PRC stimulus will most 
certainly have a direct benefit for Taipei,China exports. 
The IMF has a much more pessimistic view of Taipei,China. Global Insight is a bit more 
upbeat, but still has a lower forecast than what is projected by domestic sources. In contrast, 
the IMF believes the Republic of Korea will have the best performance among the Asian 
Tigers. Among the four Asian Tigers and the PRC, Hong Kong, China and Singapore are 
more similar due to their size, while Taipei,China  and  the Republic of Korea  are more 





















Table 3: World Economic Outlook 2009 
               
  World Economic Outlook April 2009    July Update 
Item  2007  2008  2009  2010    2009  2010 
 
World Output  5.2  3.2  (1.3)  1.9     (1.4)  2.5 
United States  2.0  1.1  (2.8)  0.0     (3.8)  0.6 
European Union  2.7  0.9  (4.2)  (0.4)     (4.8)  (0.3) 
Japan  2.4  (0.6)  (6.2)  0.5     (6.0)  1.7 
NICs  4.5  1.7  (5.4)  0.7     (5.2)  1.4 
 Hong Kong, China   6.4  2.5  (4.5)  0.5          
 Republic of Korea  5.1  2.2  (4.0)  1.5          
 Singapore  7.8  1.1  (10.0)  (0.1)          
 Taipei,China  5.7  0.1  (7.5)  0.0     (2.1)
a    
PRC  13.0  9.0  6.5  7.5     7.5  8.5 
India  9.3  7.3  4.5  5.6     5.4  6.5 
ASEAN-5  6.3  4.8  0.0  2.3     (0.3)  3.7 
 Indonesia  6.3  6.1  2.5  3.5          
 Malaysia  6.3  4.6  (3.5)  1.3          
 Philippines  7.2  4.6  0.0  1.0          
 Thailand  4.9  2.6  (3.0)  1.0          
 Viet Nam  8.5  6.2  3.3  4.0          
Notes: ( ) = negative number; NIC = newly industrialized country   
a
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 2009. 
 This is the simple average of the forecast by the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, the 
Council for Economic Planning and Development, Chung-hua Institution for Economic Research, and Taipei,China 




Table 4: Comparison of Taipei,China and Republic of Korea, 2008 
 
Item  Taipei,China 
Republic of 
Korea 
Population (million)  22.9   47.8  
     
GDP (PPP), US$ billion  695.4  1,342.0 
Growth Rate, 2007 (%)  5.7  5.1 
GDP by Sector (%)     
 Agriculture  1.4  3.0 
 Industry  27.5  39.4 
 Service  71.1  57.6 
Per Capita GDP  $30,100  $27,646 
Exports ($ billion)  246.7  371.8 
Foreign Exchange Reserve ($ billion)  274.7  264.3 
Labor Force (million)  10.78  23.99 
Labor Force by Sector (%)   
 Agriculture  5.3  17.3 
 Industry  36.8  17.3 
 Service  57.9  75.2 
Inflation Rate  1.8  2.5 
Public Debt (% of GDP)  27.9  33.5 
External Debt ($ billion)  98.4  3.7 
GDP = gross domestic product; PPP = purchasing power parity  . 
Source: CIA World Fact Book, 2009. 
The debate regarding advantages of the two industrial organizational structures has been 
ongoing for decades in both countries. It is beside the point and perhaps a bit too late in the 
development stage for both economies to consider major changes. All that can be done is to 
tilt the balance, to reverse the unattainable and most likely undesirable. It is, nevertheless, a 
part of the strategy that both governments  must  seriously  consider. As most economies 
represented here (with perhaps the exception of India) are highly export oriented, the export 
sector between the Republic of Korea and Taipei,China will be the natural final focus. 
The Republic of Korea  had  total exports for 2008 of  $371.8 billion, compared with 
Taipei,China’s $246.7 billion. But, given the fact that the Republic of Korea is more than 
twice as large (in terms of population and labor force), and has a GDP (in purchasing power 
parity terms) almost double that of Taipei,China, the comparison of exports is misleading. 
Based on the export/GDP measure, the trade dependency of Taipei,China is 35.%, while for 
the Republic of Korea  it is 27.7%. Both are relatively high when compared with the US 
(9.0%), India (14.5%), Indonesia (15.1%), or Japan (15.8%). It is comparable with the PRC 
(32.3%), but much lower than Thailand. In addition, Taipei,China and the Republic of Korea 
share another common trait: both have switched from having the US as the largest export 
market to having the PRC as the main destination for exports. 
Table 4 provides a snapshot of the current position, like the end of a long race. To get a 
better picture, we need to look at a long-term comparison. Figure 5 plots the month-to-month 
exports of the Republic of Korea and Taipei,China for the last two decades. A clear picture 
emerges. Up to the mid-1990s, Taipei,China and the Republic of Korea had comparable 
numbers, but then the Republic of Korea began to break away and extended the lead in the 
last 5 years. This raises the question, is the chaebol structure superior to SME operations? 






















































Rep. Korea's Exports Taipei,China's Exports
 
Source: Korea Customs Administration, the Republic of Korea; Department of Statistics, Ministry of Finance; 
Taipei,China 
First, the Republic of Korea’s economy is twice the size of Taipei,China. Rather than saying 
Taipei,China lost its edge, it is perhaps more appropriate to say that the Republic of Korea 
has improved its overall efficiency and is moving toward what a relative balance should be. 
Second, the PRC’s economy started to take off (after the important 1992 southern tour by 
Deng). With the passage of the Provisional Guidelines for Foreign Investment Projects (April 
1994), FDI in the PRC rose steeply; the country became the largest recipient of FDI among 
developing economies, and second only to the US (even topping the US in 2003). Also, the 
PRC started to allow foreign investors to sell part of their output domestically rather than only 
export it.  
The immediate impact was a large number of Taipei,China firms moving to the PRC (Hou 
and Zhang 2000, 2001). During this period, Taipei,China was the second largest provider of 
FDI to the PRC, after Hong Kong, China (Taipei,China investment probably exceeded that of 
true Hong Kong, China investments). In comparison, the Republic of Korea’s FDI in the PRC 
was small. This implies that many of what would have been Taipei,China exports are now 
counted as PRC exports. An interesting fact is that the number of Section 301 investigations 
against Taipei,China decreased dramatically, while the number of US investigations against 
the PRC started to rise.
15
The departure between the long-term time trend of exports between Taipei,China and the 
Republic of Korea also coincides with the time when Taipei,China reached a true two-party 
democracy. This also translated into more political positioning that may have had a negative 
 
                                                 
15 Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974, (Pub.L. 93-618, 19 U.S.C. § 2411) authorizes the US President to 
take all appropriate action, including retaliation, to obtain the removal of any act, policy, or practice of a foreign 
government that violates an international trade agreement or is unjustified, unreasonable, or discriminatory, 
and that burdens or restricts the US. 
Figure 5: The Republic of Korea and Taipei,China Monthly 




impact on economic planning and development. It also led to a long period of stalemate in 
cross-strait relations. None of these provide evidence to support the theory that the chaebol 
structure is superior to SME operations. In fact, external factors led to the divergence in 
export growth. 
4.  TAIPEI,CHINA: HAVEN OF SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED 
ENTERPRISES 
According to the official definition of the Taipei,China government (revised July 2005), SMEs 
in  manufacturing,  construction, and mining  must have  actual capitalization of less than 
NT$80 million, or fewer than 200 permanent employees; all other enterprises must have 
annual sales under NT$100 million or fewer than 50 permanent employees. From the data 
collected, the percentage of SMEs among all enterprises has never been below 96%. In fact, 
roughly one of seven workers in Taipei,China  owns his or her own business. The 2008 
figures indicate 1.23 million SMEs are  operating  (97.6% of all enterprises), employing   
8 million workers (76.6% of total employment). It is not an exaggeration to state that SMEs 
are encoded into the spirit of Taipei,China.  
Unlike  the Republic of Korea, where the chaebols were originally family businesses that 
received government-favored preference and grew into conglomerate giants, the early 
Taipei,China government  under Chiang Kai-shek intentionally separated government and 
business. The government nationalized major primary sector manufacturing into  such 
entities as Taiwan Sugar, Taiwan Salt, Taiwan Pineapple, and the Taiwan Tobacco and 
Liquor Monopoly Bureau;
16 in addition to the usual nationalization of utilities and banks. The 
best jobs were in political careers, but most people do not have the connections for these, 
thus they turned to operating their own small business. These were bankrolled via personal 
and family savings and via informal financial networks (huei or會).
17
The assigned task here is to analyze whether global economics has had any impact on the 
industrial structure of Taipei,China. Since it is dominated by SMEs, the question is whether 
the SMEs are adversely affected by this round of global economic crisis. The data is really 
not available for that explicit purpose. However, we can draw some lessons from how the 
1998 East Asian financial crisis and the 2001 recession (following the attack on the World 
Trade Center) affected SMEs in Taipei,China. The question is whether the more vulnerable 
SMEs were hit harder.  If so, this should emerge in the weight of SMEs in the overall 
Taipei,China economy.  
 
Given the time frame,  I have not delved as deep as I would have liked.  I  am  simply 
presenting  some superficial preliminary analysis. Figure 6 plots the time trend of the 
business composition of the  Taipei,China  economy.  The SMEs maintain a very high 
percentage ratio of the businesses. From 1982 to 1994, the  importance of SMEs in the 
overall picture has declined almost continuously, but that is exaggerated by the scale. It fell 
from a peak of 98.7% in 1982 to 96.3% in 1994. I am not sure what accounted for the rise 
from 1994 to 1995 (again, the scale is exaggerated in the graph). It is most likely a change in 
the  definition of SMEs. Regardless, the ratio has been incredibly stable since; a high of 
98.2% (2001) and a low of 97.6 (2007). The slight rise around 2001 was probably due to the 
World Trade Organization effect.  
 
                                                 
16 Manufacturing entities in the ADB member referred to as "Taipei,China.” 
17 This is a very interesting multistage game with a change in probability condition at every round. It is still a very 
integral part of Taipei,China society, and is usually between neighbors, colleagues, and acquaintances. It is a 





In terms of the 1998 East Asian financial crisis, SMEs accounted for 97.8% of Taipei,China’s 
total number of enterprises in 1997, 97.8% in 1998, 97.7% in 1999, and 98.1% in 2000. The 
crisis had no apparent effect. In 1998, Taipei,China’s growth rate decreased to 4.7% (from 
6.8% in 1997) and exports shrank by 9.3%. Based on the SME ratio, large enterprises and 
SMEs were hit equally hard. For the 2001–2002 recession, Taipei,China’s real GDP grew at 
6.3% in 2001 (5.5% in 2000), but contracted by 2.2% in 2002. This was followed by 3.5% 
growth in 2003 and 2.2% in 2004, before rising back to 6% in 2005. The SME ratio first rose 
then dipped and stayed stable; again, no detectable effect (Figure 6). 
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Source:   Small and Medium Enterprise White Paper . A joint publication of the Small 
       and Medium Enterprise Administration (Ministry of Economic Affairs) and 





In terms of jobs, Figure 7 illustrates two measures: (i) employment—the percentage of total 
employment accounted for by SMEs, and (ii) number of paid employees—taking owners and 
employers out of the mix. Both measures rose steadily until 1995 (not 1994) followed by a 
structural drop. Perhaps this was due to a revision of the definition; I am not certain. After 
1995, the employment ratio continued  to fall; from 78.64 in 1996 to 76.58 in 2008. In 
contrast, the paid employees ratio remained remarkably stable; from 69.24 in 1996 to 68.76 
in 2006 (lowest at 68.74 in 2004), before rising slightly to 69.60% in 2007.
18
For the net gauge, I turned my attention to the ratio of sales. I look at three measures of 
sales. The first is overall sales—out of all sales, what is the percentage from SMEs. The 
second measure is of internal (domestic) sales only, while the third looks at direct exports. 
The time series of the latter two are shorter due to data availability and other issues. There 
seems to be a slight downward trend in the ratio of total sales attributable to SMEs (overall 
sales) over the sample period, with a couple of rises in between (the 1994–1955 rise may be 
due to revision of the definition). The domestic sales pattern seems to mirror overall sales, 
but export sales showed a much more distinctive downward trend (Figure 8). 
 Again, no impact 
of the 1998 East Asian financial crisis or the 2001–2002 recession is detectable.  
 
                                                 
18 The pattern of both measures seems to indicate that the average size of SMEs has increased. 
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Source:   Small and Medium Enterprise White Paper,  a joint publication of the Small and Medium 
       Enterprise Administration (Ministry of Economic Affairs) and the Chung-Hua Institution 
       for Economic Research. Various years. 





For the overall sales and domestic sales measures, the two recessions seemed to have no 
effect. The slide in sales is more of a long-term trend than during the 1998 crisis. As for the 
2001–2002 recession, the SME share of total sales increased. This seems to signal that the 
SMEs gained in this round of economic downturn, as does the domestic sales measure. The 
export sales measure shows a more distinctive decline and cannot be explained away in the 
same way.  The relatively steep drop from 1998 to 1999  began in 1997. Without further 
study, it is difficult to claim that this decrease was the effect of the 1998 East Asian financial 
crisis.  The export sales measure was stable during  2000–2001 before starting another 
downward slide (until 2004). I am still not convinced. 
I compiled additional data for export sales, extending to 1982. However, there is a problem. 
As is evident in Figure 9, the two time series are incompatible. But the figure shows that the 
declining trend in the SME share of export sales had a much longer decline, dating back to 
perhaps 1988, or 1990 at the latest. This is not due to the economic crises—the outward pull 
of being close to the world’s largest FDI magnet.  Despite government regulations, 
Taipei,China  businesses  were  investing in the PRC long before it was formally allowed. 
Larger firms were more under the scrutiny of the government, but many SMEs were able to 
invest  in  the PRC  without formal government approval.  This is the main reason,  in my 
opinion, for the decline in the percentage weight of direct imports from Taipei,China 
attributable to SMEs. 
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Source:   Small and Medium Enterprise White Paper,   a joint publication of the Small and Medium Enterprise 
              Administration (Ministry of Economic Affairs) and the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic 
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Note: SMEs = Small and medium sized enterprises 
Source: Small and Medium Enterprise White Paper. A joint publication of the Small and Medium Enterprise 
Administration (Ministry of Economic Affairs) and the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research. Various years. 
Over the years, the main motivation for Taipei,China’s FDI changed from  almost equal 
consideration to “expansion of markets” and “low-cost of labor” to focusing on the expansion 
of market size (Chen 1992). Hou (2009b) showed that the number of Taipei,China investors 
in the PRC is almost twice as high as the “officially” authorized number. The contention here 
is that most of the unofficial investments are carried out by export-oriented SMEs as they 
seek to expand their market. Based on this self-selection, it is natural to expect that SMEs 
that stayed behind are more oriented to the domestic market than those that moved to the 
PRC.  In this aspect, the export contributions of the SMEs remain, only the mode and 
channel has changed. 
Taken in conjunction with the fact that Taipei,China’s exports to the PRC have risen so 
dramatically in the past 8 years, we can conjecture that many of these exports are probably 
intermediate goods or equipment to support Taipei,China  firms operating in the PRC. 
Statistical evidence strongly supports this claim. What I am interested in is whether we see 
such evidence even in the SMEs that stayed in Taipei,China, as SMEs operate in a chain-
link organization structure where downstream manufacturers are supplied by a series of 
suppliers that supply suppliers. Given time constraints, I have not been able to carry out a 
full investigation of this aspect and present indirect circumstantial evidence.
19
Manufacturing provides Taipei,China’s main exports.  In this study I will examine the 
manufacturing sector as a whole. In 2007, based on total sales, the two largest business 
categories were “manufacturing” and “wholesale and retail.” Manufacturing had NT$13,327.7 
billion in sales, accounting for 37.1% of the sales value of all businesses that year. SMEs 
 
                                                 
19 The entire analyses presented in this study are based on simple summary statistics and time trends. To 
rigorously analyze the economic and structural impact of the cited economic downturns, regression analysis is 




accounted for 30.19% of manufacturing sales. Wholesale and retail business sales totaled 
NT$12,613 billion, or 35.15% of all sales. In this category, SMEs accounted for 30.97%, 
slightly higher than manufacturing. However, the export value indicates the two categories 
show significant differences.  
For manufacturing, the export value is NT$6,254 billion, or 46.92% of the sales value. Of 
this, the export value attributed to SMEs is NT$1,150 billion, or 18.39% of manufacturing 
exports. In contrast, wholesale and retail export value is NT$2,758 billion, or only 21.87% of 
the sales value. SMEs still account for an impressive 16.3% of export values in this category, 
but the dollar value is substantially lower at NT$450 billion. As a pure conjecture, these 
exports could be part of the supply link to Taipei,China’s FDI in the PRC.  
As manufacturing is  the largest export category in overall value and among SMEs, a 
snapshot of the timeline would be useful.  In 1982, SMEs accounted for 75.53% of 
manufacturing exports. By 1990, this ratio had fallen to 60.49%, perhaps reflecting the start 
of SMEs moving to the PRC. The true evidence is when we compare data from 1998 with 
1990. In 1998, SMEs only accounted for a mere 20.46% of manufacturing exports.
20 This 
reflects the surge of Taipei,China’s FDI in the PRC in the 1990s (Hou and Zhang 2000 and 
2001), and the very large amount of “unauthorized” investments (Hou 2009b), which are 
mostly likely made by SMEs rather than large enterprises. This ratio continued to fall among 
manufacturing, but at a much slower pace (to 18.39% in 2007), as most export-oriented 
SMEs interested in the PRC had probably already located there, and increasingly larger 
firms were providing FDI in Taipei,China.
21
What I have tried to establish is that there does not seem to be any strong direct impact of 
external economic downturns on the industrial structure of Taipei,China, certainly not by firm 
size. What we observe is that Taipei,China is located alongside the world’s second largest 
destination for FDI, one of the world’s largest markets (at least in potential). Furthermore, it 
is an economy where Taipei,China entrepreneurs share the same history, language, and 
culture.  So, the changes  in  Taipei,China’s export patterns, in  outward FDI, and in the 
composition of SMEs are largely due to this effect, which will overshadow any downturn in 
the global economy. 
 
5.  PRELUDE TO THE POLICY DISCUSSION 
This discussion has established several things. Taipei,China is extremely trade dependent 
and this has not abated since the 1998 East Asian crisis, nor the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the 
US. If anything, its trade dependency has not only increased, but the composition of its 
export destination has had major realignments. The PRC has replaced the US as 
Taipei,China’s largest trading partner, followed by ASEAN. This trend most likely will 
continue, with the only question about the relative composition of the PRC and ASEAN. In 
my evaluation this is a positive situation for Taipei,China under the current economic crisis, 
as these two economies and regions represent the two strongest performers. The only thing 
that could have improved Taipei,China’s situation is if Taipei,China had a stronger trade 
relationship with India. 
Another important characteristic of Taipei,China  is the dominance of SMEs, which  will 
always be part of the Taipei,China  economic infrastructure.  The large conglomerate 
structure of Japan and the Republic of Korea certainly has its advantages, but so do the 
SMEs.  For example, the chaebols  can take advantage of  such items as  large-scale 
operations and economies of scale, brand recognition, and easier financing. But they suffer 
from structural rigidity and enormous overhead, and these become heavy burdens during 
                                                 
20 Even if we adjust for the potential structural change in the new definitions, it would still represent close to 40% 
of the manufacturing export attributed to SMEs. 




significant downturns. During the 1998 Asian crisis, Taipei,China’s economic growth fell from 
6.8% in 1997 to 4.65% in 1998. However, the Republic of Korea’s real GDP growth rate 
plunged from 4.65% growth to a 6.85% contraction.
22
In contrast, SMEs are flexible in structure; quick to respond to business opportunities; and 
easier to adjust to downturns due to lower overhead, efficiency, and customer orientation. 
The entrepreneurs operating SMEs are industrious, innovative, and always keep a sharp eye 
on the latest technology available and trends in the market. They are like mobile special 
forces units that can move in and out of market segments with ease; this is not the case for 
large industrial firms. These characteristics of SMEs are why they are often called the engine 
of Taipei,China’s economic success. 
. 
However, SMEs also face inherent disadvantages. The survival rate of SMEs decreases with 
the age of the business—only 62% of SMEs survive to their 5th year, this drops to 42% by 
the 10th year. This reflects such characteristics as small scale of operation, weak capital 
resources, and lack of transparency in accounting practices. The last aspect is often fatal as 
it hampers their ability to obtain credit from banking institutions, as the usage of loans and 
the source of repayment are often unclear. The collateral they submit is also highly volatile in 
terms of business cycles, thus making them vulnerable during credit crunches.
23
Another major characteristic is that Taipei,China has perhaps one of the lowest illiteracy 
rates (just over 2%) and among the best-educated labor force in the world. Currently it has 
over 160 colleges and universities, plus 16 junior colleges, with an enrollment in excess of a 
million students. It is arguable that Taipei,China is overeducated (Wang 2003). In 1985, it 
had 27 colleges and universities; by 1990 the number had surged to 46 and by 1995 to 60. 
By  2000,  it  had 127 college and universities, and within a few year this  swelled to 142 
(Ministry of Education, Taipei,China, 2003/04). 
 To assist 
SMEs during this round of crisis, the government needs to take explicit measures and 
perhaps bear the risk burden that banks are not willing to take on. On the opposite side, 
SMEs should be more mindful of government policy actions and make proactive inquiries 
about the possibility of assistance or alternatives. 
Given the rapid increase in colleges and universities, one has to admire the government’s 
commitment to higher education, but also ask whether it is warranted. In a 1991 interview 
with  Money Matters of the BBC,
24
6.  POLICY RESPONSE: SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM 
 I laid out the best possible scenario for the future of 
Taipei,China, which I will elaborate on more in the next section. In my opinion 1991 was the 
peak of Taipei,China’s economic prowess, and over the last decade and a half it  has 
squandered much of its economic capital. It is not too late, but a bold long-term plan needs 
to be established.  
At the outset, I would like to express a firm belief that I have had for close to   
15 years. With the rise of the PRC, the traditional sense of the “flying geese” pattern of 
development is no longer applicable for Asia (Hou et al 1995). Instead, we will see a much 
higher degree of specialization of the other Asian economies as none can compete with the 
PRC’s production. Each economy will have to pick a narrower specialization and hope to 
gain from technology agglomeration. We see this in the Asian Tigers, and are seeing similar 
                                                 
22 The IMF’s 1998 World Economic Outlook only projected a 0.8% contraction. 
23 In addition to the higher risk associated with loans to SMEs, these loans are usually smaller and hence 
translate into higher institutional cost as the fixed cost associated with each loan does not differ much with the 
loan size. This, all things being equal, will reduce the willingness of banks to actively engage in smaller loans. 
24 The interview was in response to Taipei,China  Aerospace’s $2 billion bid for a 40% stake in McDonnell 




patterns among the ASEAN-5. This implies a more explicit role for government in guiding the 
market mechanism. This characteristic of the Asian Tigers will most likely continue. 
In a global economic crisis, the role of government is perhaps even more important. In real 
life, we mostly rely on our immune system to assure our health. When a mild illness occurs, 
we may take medications but rely on our body’s immune system to restore our health; much 
like the market relies on the invisible hand in a mild recession.  But when a truly major 
disease or injury occurs, we turn to our doctors and view them as our saviors; just like now 
when we turn to government leaders and hope that they will save the day (Hou 2007). The 
state we are in falls into this category.  The increase  in  government regulation that will 
undoubtedly follow will lead to an increase in the cost of doing business, but the potential 
reduction of long-term risk exposure could be a plus (Hou 2009bc). 
Taipei,China (as in other newly industrialized countries) has high foreign exchange reserves 
and high saving rates, enhancing the ability to weather this storm. In addition its financial 
market is still under development
25 and not fully integrated internationally. In the US, the 
large conglomerates like General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford suffered tremendous loss in 
their stock value. Taipei,China is dominated by SMEs; large firms do not have the same 
overbearing overhead as the US firms, or even that of Japan and the Republic of Korea. 
Thus, though the stock market has lost a lot of value, the financial misery index is still much 
better than in some neighboring countries. With the change of administration, the arrival of 
PRC institutional investors, and the impending Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement (ECFA), Taipei,China stocks are showing impressive gains, perhaps a leading 
indicator of things to come. In addition, Taipei,China’s earlier GDP slowdown and worrisome 
drop in exports is at least partly due to manufacturers in the PRC (many of which are 
Taipei,China  FDI firms) that  are drawing down their inventories and not ordering 
replacements.  As the shelves become bare, combined with the possibility that the US 
economy may have bottomed out, we see healthy signs that Taipei,China’s electronic chip 
sales have been picking up since July 2009 (as reported by Taiwan Semiconductor
26
The Taipei,China government has carried out a host of standard stimulus policies, many of 
which mirror those that the PRC and the US have undertaken. The economic effects of 
these government actions are starting to be felt or will soon materialize. The discussion of 
these policies is readily available. My focus here will be to  point out things that the 
government needs to be more aware of in the short term (mostly relating to SMEs), and 
propose a long-run industrial policy perspective to aid the structural rebalance of the 
economy.  
). 
Before I do that I must applaud the ingenuity of Taipei,China’s consumption coupon policy, 
which theoretically reduces the negative effect of the Ricardian equivalence. In addition, it 
should reduce the substitution effect and create a larger net expansionary effect.  This 
innovative approach to the standard tax rebate has attracted much attention and  may 
become the prototype of a new variation to a standard expansionary fiscal policy instrument 
that is taught in standard macroeconomics. 
Short-Term Policy 
While SMEs have the operating advantage of flexibility and mobility, they are weighed down 
by difficulty in obtaining credit from banking institutions.  A major cause is the lack of 
transparency in their accounting practices, combined with the fact that most of their collateral 
is procyclical, and hence when a major downturn occurs, the value of this collateral drops 
precariously, making an additional line of credit impossible, not to mention the threat of a 
recall of existing loans.  
                                                 
25 For example, asset securitization, the root cause of the subprime mortgage crisis, is still in the development 
stages (Lin 2008). 




The Central Bank of Taipei,China has lowered the key interest rate several times. However, 
the problem is not that the banks do not have the credit, but that with the severe economic 
contraction and uncertain (immediate) future of profitability of most firms, this raises the risk 
of credit loans and hence has deterred many banks from actively giving out loans. This is not 
unique to Taipei,China; it is also a serious matter in the US. In addition, even firms in good 
financial shape (hence less of a loan risk) are uncertain about how long the sluggish sales 
will persist and have mostly postponed their plans to expand, thus reducing the demand for 
loans (a classical example of what Keynes pointed out as the asymmetric performance of 
monetary policy). 
The Taipei,China government has implemented many actions to assist SMEs, but the results 
have been disappointing.  In June 2008,  the  government implemented plans to increase 
loans to SMEs. The stated objective was to increase total loans to NT$300 billion by the end 
of 2009. Yet, since July 2008, bank loans shrank to NT$170 billion (April 2009),
27 prompting 
the government to urgently revise the plan to aid the credit crunch of SMEs. One step was to 
increase the government credit guarantee up to 90%.
28
I propose that the credit guarantee be immediately raised to 100%, and have this effective 
until June 2010. This is not a blank check for all SMEs. The government should use this 
opportunity to implement accounting reforms for SMEs. In the current stage, all SMEs that 
seek financing to ease their credit crunch must have their accounting books certified by 
independent certified public accountants. This will identify weak SMEs and any SMEs that 
are operating under false pretenses. With this certification, the government would provide a 
100% guarantee to the bank and bear the risk that financial institutions are not willing to 
take. This should increase credit to SMEs that have a legitimate claim to future success and 
help them through the global crisis.  
 Yet, the average loan–equity ratio is 
only 70%, and credit loans to SMEs continue to deteriorate (be it at a slower rate). 
After the recovery, hopefully uniform and transparent accounting practice will become 
standard business practice to help monitor the financial health of SMEs and reduce the risk 
that banks bear. This should allow SMEs easier access to bank credit and at a better interest 
rate.  These types of cost reductions  due to government regulations are what I term 
“negative” transmission costs (Hou 2009c).
29
In conjunction with this proposal, the government should conduct a standard survey of these 
SMEs as they move through the process of credit approval. The questions should include: 
 Even in this difficult time for many SMEs, they 
should be reminded that crisis also implies opportunities. Those that are willing to embrace 
this accounting reform will not only increase their chance of surviving the crisis, but also gain 
market share with the demise of many competitors and create new business opportunities. 
  What is the most important assistance the government can provide to SMEs? 
  Do they have business operations in the PRC? If not, do they expect to in the near 
future? 
  If they have established FDIs in the PRC, what is the reason they chose to do so? What 
are the difficulties they face in the PRC? 
  If the government provides assistance for product development and design, would it be 
interested in co-financing such research and development (R&D)?  
Aside from the SME issue, Taipei,China needs to have a more explicit cross-strait economic 
agreement. The proposed Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement is a start, but the 
                                                 
27 Compared with March, the April loans to SME were down by NT$25.7 billion. 
28 This is not unique to Taipei,China. The US increased the credit guarantee from 75% to 90%, effective until the 
end of 2009. Japan’s guarantee is 100%, effective from October 2008 until April 2010. Singapore raised the 
guarantee limit from 80% to 90%. 
29 This is negative in the sense that unlike the normal concept of costs, this actually reduces the cost of 




protection of Taipei,China firms in the PRC (especially SMEs) needs to be explicitly put on 
the table and a workable agreement reached in the earliest possible time frame. Given that 
the PRC accounts for more than 40% of Taipei,China’s exports and 208% of Taipei,China’s 
trade surplus, a coordinated policy pack would be beneficial. 
Finally, the key to Taipei,China’s  economic recovery is not merely exports.  Domestic 
consumption needs to be revived and the government has taken many measures to support 
this. However, what has really fallen on the domestic absorption side is investment. The 
government needs to take an equally aggressive attitude to encouraging  domestic 
investment as it has done toward consumption. The proposed short-run policy to aid SMEs 
can be viewed as a way to funnel domestic private investment to SMEs that need credit 
easing? 
Long-Term Policy 
This is basically a national industrial strategy based on my personal naïve view. In my 1991 
BBC interview, I proposed a development strategy of having Taipei,China gradually withdraw 
from manufacturing and elevate into a product development and design economy. In other 
words, shedding the manufacturing role (given  the  loss of  comparative advantage) and 
becoming a big brain of R&D. At that time I was applauding Taipei,China’s effort to establish 
science and technology universities. I had envisioned it as a second-round human capital 
upgrade.  
For those too young to remember, in 1968 Taipei,China extended compulsory education 
from 6 to 9 years. In 1971, massive numbers of junior high school gradates were flooding out 
of the school gates, so the government passed the Statue to Encourage the Establishment 
of Vocational High Schools in 1970/71. This was instrumental when Taipei,China’s industrial 
base upgraded from textiles and other consumer goods (for example, umbrellas and shoes) 
to electronics in the late 1970s, as the skilled labor force was in place. That is why I had 
envisioned high-quality  science and technology universities producing quality laboratory 
technicians  to  serve under top research scientists  and  engineers with graduate degrees 
either domestically, or more likely from Japan, the US, and Europe. In a consulting role for 
the Council of Labor Affairs (Hou 1997), I advocated using the importation of foreign labor as 
a tool to mandate industrial upgrades of Taipei,China firms.  
Unfortunately  the government  chose a different path.  The  numbers of graduates from 
bachelor-granting colleges and universities grew unabated, as many former vocational high 
schools,  established in the 1970s,  were upgraded to technical colleges and even 
universities. Despite this, the number of students majoring in science and technology has 
decreased. In 1998/99, science and technology accounted for 54.89% of enrollment, but the 
ratio dropped to 47.53% by 2008/09; signaling that many science and technology 
universities are becoming regular comprehensive institutions of higher education. 
Furthermore, the quality of education, perhaps better put, the quality of college students, has 
deteriorated.
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I hope the government follows through and brings the institutions of higher education up to 
par. The following are a few ideas. They are not meant to be well-thought out, detailed 
proposals—that requires a lot more work and is an independent project in itself. 
 The government has recognized the seriousness of the problem and started 
rigorous external reviews and accreditation procedures that will have the power to reduce 
the allowed enrollment of colleges and universities. 
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In addition to restoring science and technology universities to what they should be—a source 
of preparing solid science and engineers to play supporting roles in research and leadership 
roles in production,  the government should create public funds to provide, for example,  
2-year subsidies to Taipei,China researchers abroad to provide them with an incentive to 
return home. For those with patents or technology, the government should provide them with 
seed money to establish technology firms, much like in the Hsinchu Science and Industrial 
Park (established 1980), which has become the hotbed for Taipei,China’s semiconductor, 
computer, telecommunications, and optoelectronics industries, including the world’s top two 
semiconductor foundries: Taipei,China Semiconductor Manufacturing Company and United 
Microelectronics Corporation.  
Industrial Technology Research Institute, a state-sponsored think tank located in the 
neighborhood of the science park, has played an important role in advancing Taipei,China’s 
manufacturing processes. However, its effectiveness has been diminishing and a revamp is 
needed. Perhaps a new system should be considered where laboratories and researchers 
are established as semi self-sufficient institutions where they accept contracts from SMEs 
and the smaller of the large enterprises for product development and design. With these 
contracts as collateral, they can seek government funds to carry out high-end R&D. Their 
research results will be split between the funding SMEs, the research laboratories, and the 
government, with a sharing ratio to be determined. This will allow SMEs with development 
concepts,  but lacking  the  budget,  to carry out R&D without having full-time staff.  If 
successful,  these research labs will attract Taipei,China  researchers  living  abroad (and 
foreign  researchers alike).  It can also provide employment for the top science and 
technology  university graduates.  The government, via matching research grants,  can 
subsidize innovative SMEs and reap part of the reward to fund future research grants.  
Unlike the Industrial Technology Research Institute, which has a top–down R&D framework, 
the proposed network of laboratories would function as a bottom–up process and may be 
more effective in supporting R&D needs of the vibrant SMEs. This will also have the effect of 
generating sustainable employment within Taipei,China. For example, the SMEs could 
produce the initial rounds of production in Taipei,China to get rid of the glitches and smooth 
out the production process.  These  factories could employ many of the science  and 
technology graduates as production supervisors or higher paid production technicians to 
assure the highest quality of production. After the production process is perfected, it can stay 
in Taipei,China or be moved to production facilities in the PRC or ASEAN-5 countries. This is 
consistent with the administration’s argument that the three-direct links will make it easier for 
business to keep the most advanced part of their operation, the R&D, and high-salaried 
management division in Taipei,China.
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Picking the Next Generation of Industrial Winners 
  
Though not without debate, one can argue that the Taipei,China government played a key 
role in picking “winners” in its incentive guidance. The fact that Taipei,China has seven firms 
in the world’s top 100 in the communication technology industry (second only to the US with 
63 companies) can be viewed as proof.  The following have been floated as possibly 
Taipei,China’s next industrial darlings: Biotech, Optical Communication Technology, and 
Alternative Energy (solar panels, LED). 
If true, the Taipei,China government should provide seed money to attract specialists of the 
targeted areas. In addition, the National Science Council should list specific grants for 
projects in these areas to encourage research in universities that will foster the training and 
education of future scholars and researchers in these areas, much like what the US did to 
attract college students to study engineering to fulfill President Kennedy’s challenge of the 
                                                 
31 This was elaborated by our distinguished keynote speaker, Professor Jagdish N. Bhagwati, in an article he 




moon landing. The Taipei,China government has implemented policies aimed exactly at this. 
Of course, this should be no surprise as it has the fortune of having a large group of 
concerned academics and government officials. Thus,  a good policy direction can never 
have too many advocates. 
Tourism, the Other Sustainable Industry 
Because Taipei,China initiated the 5-day work week in 2003, domestic tourism has become 
a growth business. Improvement in transportation infrastructure has made this attractive, 
with private bed and breakfast hostels opening across the island. Since 20 May 2008, the 
three-direct links (“direct” transport, postal services, and trade) became the formal target, 
and many direct flights are available between Taipei,China and the PRC. This benefits the 
nearly 1 million people from Taipei,China living or working semi-permanently in the PRC, 
and makes travel to the PRC much more convenient for Taipei,China tourists. The next big 
step is to expand the quota for mainland Chinese tourists to visit Taipei,China. 
This is an almost inexhaustible resource for Taipei,China as practically everyone in the PRC, 
given the chance, would visit Taipei,China. Of course, unlike tourists going to the PRC 
where the choices are varied and area vast, Taipei,China is a pond compared to the great 
lake of the PRC. To maintain the quality of the experience for Chinese tourists and the 
standard of life of Taipei,China residents, quantity control is a necessity, but that capacity 
limit  is far above what is allowed. Taipei,China should plan ahead and develop hotel 
management personnel; this may lead to one of the more important majors in Taipei,China 
universities.  
This is an important comparative advantage that Taipei,China enjoys. When a Chinese 
family considers a vacation abroad, they may be looking at the Republic of Korea, Japan, 
Malaysia, Philippines, or Thailand. However, unlike those that are substitutes for each 
another, Taipei,China is in a unique category that has no substitutes. All 1.3 billion people in 
the PRC would like the opportunity to visit Taipei,China at least once, and when they have 
all done so, their children and grandchildren probably would also want to visit. This is a 
sustainable and green industry. 
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Unlike some of its neighbors that are represented at this conference,
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Thus, the rebalancing of industries is due to this trade relationship rather than in response to 
the current global economic crisis. The SMEs are affected differently than large enterprises, 
but that simply reflects the pursuit of expanding markets, and is the result of the flexible and 
mobile nature of SMEs. Again, the main effect has little to do with the current crisis. With this 
said, the SMEs do face more dire circumstances than larger firms as they are considered 
riskier business (and more costly) from the banks’ point of view. A workable proposal is 
presented that will allow the Taipei,China government to increase aid to SMEs in exchange 
for accounting reform, which in the long-run will make it easier for SMEs to obtain bank 
  the industrial 
imbalance as a result of the global economic crisis is not evident in Taipei,China; especially 
when it comes to the effect by firm size. Taipei,China has always been dominated by SMEs. 
Their share in terms of weight in number, sales, and exports show different time trends, but 
no apparent effect of the Asian crisis, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, or the current downturn is 
detectable. The long-term trend persists and is more due to the magnetic effect of being 
alongside the PRC, and the sharing of the culture, history, and language links that make 
Taipei,China firms investment in the PRC more natural and inevitable than firms from Japan, 
the Republic of Korea, or Singapore. 
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credit at better rates. For the long run, I propose an industrial strategy that links one of 
Taipei,China’s most important resource, human capital, to R&D, and to explicitly link it to 
SMEs. R&D has often been a weak link among SMEs, the proposed profit-sharing scheme 
in R&D development may provide a platform that channels government subsidy and 
guidance to product development and design that would foster SME growth.  
I should emphasize that crisis implies opportunity. This is especially true for SMEs. By 
complying with the proposed government initiative to bring transparency to their accounting 
procedures, they can gain government guaranteed credit, which will see them through this 
difficult period. With their accounting practices up to standard, this dramatically reduces their 
risk in the eyes of financial institutions and will greatly increase the probability that they will 
obtain credit through the banks in the intermediate run. If the government does move to the 
proposed bottom-up R&D and the SMEs buy into this system, they will be able to open a 
pipeline of product design and advancements that will spur growth in the long run. 
Combined, the SMEs will be able to maintain and increase international competitiveness. 
The crisis will undoubtedly identify weak firms, which means those that do work with the 
government will have the chance to grow and expand their market share. 
Two other areas are highlighted: picking the next industrial area of Taipei,China, and 
developing the other sustainable green industry—tourism. The former can be for larger firms 
and upwardly mobile SMEs. Tourism from the PRC is a unique comparative advantage that 
the Taipei,China economy has, which has no competition. It would be foolish not to exploit 
this abundant source of income. This will have considerable multiplier effects on the service 
industry in Taipei,China, which is also dominated by SMEs. 
Taipei,China and the PRC share the same history, culture, and language; whatever the 
political differences that may exist in the interim, the strengthening  economic ties 
necessitates the replacement of competition and suppression with cooperation and 
collaboration to make the two economies reach complementarity that will benefit people on 
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